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"GRAYLISTING" OF FEDERAL CONTRACTORS:
TRANSCO SECURITY, INC. OF OHIO V
FREEMAN AND PROCEDURAL
DUE PROCESS UNDER
SUSPENSION PROCEDURES
The federal government is the nation's largest single purchaser of goods
and services. In fiscal year 1982, federal agencies will spend approximately
$90 billion to procure services, build weapons systems, and fund research
and development efforts in the military, scientific, and social science
fields.' The vast majority of the government's needs are fulfilled by'con-
tracting with the private sector. Many firms in turn depend on federal con-
tracts for a significant portion of their business.2
A complex system of statutory and regulatory safeguards has evolved
over the years to assure that federal procurement dollars are well spent and
that the government receives the best possible product for the lowest possi-
ble price.3 In addition, the government must be assured that the contractor
from which it is purchasing goods or services is competent or "responsi-
ble"4 and that it has had a satisfactory performance record under previous
1. Although overall figures are difficult to ascertain, fiscal 1982 budget projections re-
flect defense procurement funding of $40.1 billion, NASA funding of $7.6 billion, and ap-
proximately $41.7 billion in research and development funding agency-wide. Budget of the
United States Government, Fiscal Year 1982, Executive Office of the President, Office of
Management and Budget.
2. See Steadman, "Banned In Boston And Birmingham And Boise And. . ."Due Pro-
cess In The Debarment And Suspension Of Government Contractors, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 793,
794 n.3 (1976).
3. For instance, in 1962 Congress enacted Pub. L. No. 87-563, 76 Stat. 528 (1962)
(codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 2304(g) (1976)), which requires proposals under negoti-
ated procurements to be solicited from the maximum number of qualified sources and re-
quires specified contractors to certify as to the accuracy and completeness of their cost and
pricing data before an award is made.
4. The Armed Services Procurement Act, Pub. L. No. 84-1028, 70A Stat. 127 (1956)
(codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 2301-14 (1976)), requires that contract awards be made
to the "responsible bidder whose bid . . . will be the most advantageous to the United
States, price and other factors considered." Responsibility has been construed to extend
beyond financial stability to factors of "judgment, skill, ability, capacity and integrity."
O'Brien v. Carney, 6 F. Supp. 761, 762 (D. Mass. 1934). The statutory requirement is re-
flected in the procurement regulations. See 32 C.F.R. § 1-900 to 1-907 (1981) and 41 C.F.R.
§ 1-1.1203 (1981) which basically require that a prospective contractor have adequate
financial resources, be able to meet the proposed delivery schedule, have a satisfactory per-
formance record on prior government contracts, have satisfactory record of integrity and
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federal contracts.
The government's ultimate protections against contractors who have
committed willful misconduct or performed inadequately under past con-
tracts are debarment and suspension.5 A debarred contractor is precluded
from receiving federal contract awards for a specified period of time, not to
exceed three years.6 The grounds for debarment are both statutory and
administrative, reflecting the dual nature of the government's contractual
role.7 The federal government frequently uses its procurement purse-
strings to promote various socio-economic policies that are otherwise unre-
lated to the acquisition of goods and services.8 On the other hand, when
the government enters the marketplace, it must deal on the same terms as
all other businessmen.9 In so doing, it seeks to get the best buy for its
dollar and to assure that its contractors possess skill, the capacity to per-
form, and business integrity.' 0 Therefore, contractors may be administra-
tively debarred based on clear and convincing evidence of fraud or related
misconduct. "
The lesser sanction of suspension is generally imposed as a preliminary
otherwise be qualified for award. For a general discussion of the nature of responsibility
determinations, see Miller, Administrative Discretion in the Award of Federal Contracts, 53
MICH. L. REV. 781, 786-91 (1955).
5. See 41 C.F.R. § 1-1.600 (1981) (civilian agencies); 32 C.F.R. § 1-600 (1981) (mili-
tary agencies).
6. See 41 C.F.R. § 1-1.603 (1981); 32 C.F.R. § 1-604.2 (1981). Continued performance
of existing contracts is permissible; however, funds due or to become due under such con-
tracts may be withheld to protect the government's interest. 32 C.F.R. § 1-603(b) (1981).
7. See [1974] Debarment of Government Contractors and the Requirements of Proce-
dural Due Process, 530 Fed. Cont. Rep. K-I (BNA).
8. There are currently about 80 federal statutes authorizing the so-called "inducement
debarments." Dembling, Debarment and Suspension, 4 BRIEFING PAPERS COLLECTION 257
(1978) (FED. PUB.). The most important of these include: the Service Contract Act, 41 U.S.C.
§ 351 (1976); the Davis-Bacon Act, 40 U.S.C. § 276(a) (1976); the Walsh-Healey Public Con-
tracts Act, 41 U.S.C. § 35 (1976); the Buy American Act, 41 U.S.C. § 10(a) (1976); and the
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (1976). A more comprehensive list is found at 41 C.F.R. § 1-
1.602-1 (1981). For a broad discussion comparing statutory and administrative debarments,
see A. Lahendro, The Debarment and Suspension of Government Contractors: Who's On
First? (1975) (unpublished thesis on file at the George Washington University, Washington,
D.C.).
9. United States v. Bostwick, 94 U.S. 53, 66 (1876).
10. The procurement statutes require that federal contracts be awarded only after the
broadest competition available is secured. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 2304(a) (1976). Regardless
of whether the award results from formal advertising or competitive negotiations, however,
the procuring agency must ascertain that the proposed awardee is responsive to the request
for proposals or invitation for bids and that he is responsible. Responsibility involves a de-
termination that the contractor has the capacity to perform the contract based on past expe-
rience, credit, integrity, perserverance, and tenacity. See supra note 4.
11. 41 C.F.R. § 1-1.604(b)(4) (1981).
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step to debarment. 2 This sanction is governed exclusively by regulation
because it is designed to protect the government pending an investigation
of contractor misconduct.' 3 Contractors may be suspended temporarily up
to eighteen months upon adequate evidence of fraud, criminal conduct or
other serious cause that calls into question a contractor's ability to perform
a contract adequately.' 4
In view of the drastic nature of both debarment and suspension, and in
response to a series of decisions by the United States Court of Appeals for
12. A suspension-though admittedly a less drastic sanction than debarment-has a
number of onerous direct and collateral consequences. In addition to preventing a contrac-
tor from doing business with the government for a period of up to 18 months, 41 C.F.R. § I-
1.605-2(a) (1981), see Park Poly-bag Corp., GSBCA. Nos. 5744-S, 5756-S, 80-2 BCA
14,600, contracts entered into by the suspending agency with the contractor are void ab
initio; therefore the administrative boards of contract appeals lack jurisdiction to consider
appeals from default terminations of such contracts. See, e.g., City Window Cleaners, IBCA
No. 1218-10-18, 79-2 BCA 13,901. But see Paisner v. United States, 150 F. Supp. 835 (Ct.
Cl. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 941 (1958) (allowing recovery of the contract price, less
profit, for that portion of the contract which had been performed).
13. Suspensions are not required in the statutory debarment area because there is no
need to take interim action upon a mere suspicion that a statute is being violated. Steadman,
supra note 2, at 808.
14. 41 C.F.R. § 1-1.605-1(a)(2) (1981) provides that a contractor may be suspended
upon adequate evidence of "other cause of such serious and compelling nature, affecting
responsibility as a Government contractor, as may be determined by the agency to warrant
suspension." An identical catch-all category is provided in the Defense Acquisition Regula-
tion (DAR). See 31 C.F.R. § 1-605.1(ii) (1981). Agency officials have broad discretion-
within the limits of due process-in deciding whether there is a "reasonable basis for suspi-
cion" of fraud. See Lahendro, supra note 8, at 45. Based on interviews with a number of
agency officials responsible for debarment and suspension, Lahendro concludes that they do
not generally concern themselves with precise evidentiary standards, rather "the actual stan-
dard appears to be that they are certain in their own minds that the offense occurred." Id.
The breadth of agency discretion in determining whether to debar or suspend potentially
results in uneven treatment of contractors because the agencies are often unwilling, as a
practical matter, to suspend or debar a contractor whose product is essential. Illustrative is
Kahn's Bakery, B-185025, 76-2 CPD 106, in which the Comptroller General upheld an
agency's responsibility determination, notwithstanding the contractor's violation of the anti-
trust laws because Kahn was the sole source of supply in that geographic area. The substan-
tial discretion vested in agency officials is reflected in the broad language in 41 C.F.R. § I-
605 (1981) authorizing suspension for "other cause[s] of serious and compelling nature af-
fecting responsibility." The regulations thus permit an agency to suspend a contractor who
has previously been determined to be nonresponsible. Eg., Drexel Industries, Inc., B-
189344, 77-2 CPD 433 (causes for suspension set forth in 41 C.F.R. § 1-605.1 (1981) may
be used to determine "integrity" pursuant to responsibility determinations). Conversely, de-
barment or suspension by one agency may result in a nonresponsibility determination by
another agency. If this occurs, a contractor has few avenues of relief available because the
Comptroller General will not, in most instances, review affirmative agency determinations
of contractor responsibility. Building Maintenance Specialists, Inc., 54 CoMp. GEN. 703, 75-
1 CPD 122.
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the District of Columbia,"5 agency regulations currently provide some pro-
cedural safeguards for bidders prior to either suspension or debarment in
order to protect contractors' "liberty" interest in doing business with the
government.1 6 These protections include notice and an opportunity to re-
but charges of wrongdoing.1 7 An administrative hearing following suspen-
sion may be refused, however, if the Department of Justice advises the
agency that a hearing would prejudice prosecutorial action against the
contractor. 18
Such was the case in Transco Security, Inc. of Ohio v. Freeman.
Transco Security, Inc. of Ohio (Transco-Ohio), the successor corporation
of Transco Security, Inc. of Delaware (Transco-Delaware) was engaged in
the business of supplying guard services to the government.20 Since its for-
mation in September 1978, Transco dealt exclusively with federal agencies,
and as of February 1, 1980, it was performing ten small business set-aside
guard service contracts at various General Services Administration (GSA)
installations throughout the country. 2'
15. See Old Dominion Dairy Prod., Inc. v. Secretary of Defense, 631 F.2d 953 (D.C.
Cir. 1980); Home Bros., Inc. v. Laird, 463 F.2d 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Gonzalez v. Freeman,
334 F.2d 570 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
16. See 41 C.F.R. § 1-1.605-3 (1981) (notice); 41 C.F.R. § 1-1.605-4 (1981) (hearing).
17. Id.
18. Id. § 1-1.605-4(e) (1981).
19. 639 F.2d 318 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 101 (1981).
20. A number of the contracts being performed by Transco-Ohio at the time of the
suspension originally had been awarded to Transco-Delaware, a small business concern
wholly-owned by plaintiff Frank Gaviglia and his wife prior to the formation of Transco-
Ohio. Transco-Delaware had been certified as a small business by the Small Business Ad-
ministration Size Appeals Board on March 30, 1977. Brief for Respondents in Opposition at
4-5, Transco Security, Inc. v. Freeman, 639 F.2d 318 (6th Cir. 1981). Under 41 C.F.R. § 1-
1.703-2 (1981), any bidder may challenge the small business status of any other bidder or
offeror by delivering a written protest to the contracting officer, who in turn, submits the
protest to the appropriate regional SBA office for a determination of the bidder's eligibility.
An adverse determination by an SBA Regional Office may be appealed to the SBA Size
Appeals Board pursuant to 41 C.F.R. § 1-1.703-2(f) (1981). Financial reversals which
plagued Transco-Delaware prompted Gaviglia to abandon it as a going concern in Septem-
ber 1978. Following the Delaware corporation's demise, a separate and distinct entity-
Transco-Ohio--was formed. The new corporation, which was also certified as a small busi-
ness, assumed the existing GSA security contracts as well as the withholding tax liability of
the Delaware corporation. See Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari, at 2, Transco Security, Inc. v.
Freeman, 639 F.2d 318 (6th Cir. 1981).
21. Congress initially set forth its policy of assisting and protecting small businesses
through enactment of the Small Business Act of 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-163, 67 Stat. 232 (1953)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 631-47 (1976)). The statute provides direct and indirect
loans and management advice to small business concerns. In addition, the Act provides
assistance keyed to a variety of government procurement programs. For instance, section
8(a) of the statute, 15 U.S.C. § 644 (1976), authorizes the Small Business Administration to
enter into prime contracts directly with the procuring agencies, and to subcontract the work
[Vol. 31:731
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Transco continued to perform its GSA service contracts until January
28, 1980, when it was suspended from receiving further contracts based
upon alleged fraudulent conduct in obtaining and performing its existing
contracts." The January 28 notice did not state the grounds for the suspen-
sion.23 The notice was supplemented, however, on February 15, 1980
when Fred Gaviglia, Transco-Ohio's president, was informed that the
GSA Inspector General's evidence included "billing irregularities" and
"misrepresentations by the corporation regarding its eligibility for public
contracts."24 Gaviglia was suspended because he was an officer of both
Transco-Delaware and Transco-Ohio.25 Transco was never advised of the
nature of the alleged billing irregularities, or that GSA suspected the com-
pany of misrepresenting the caliber of its employees.
Transco requested a hearing on its suspension, 26 but its request was de-
nied after the Justice Department informed GSA that release of any infor-
mation to Transco would prejudice its criminal investigation.27 Transco
to small business concerns. The SBA subsequently established the "8(a) set-aside program"
through which these subcontracts are awarded to qualifying firms on a noncompetitive sole-
source basis. The 1978 amendments to the Act (Pub. L. No. 95-507, 92 Stat. 1757), strength-
ened the § 8(a) program by mandating an automatic set-aside of all contracts under $10,000.
The requirement has been implemented in the agency procurement regulations. See 41
C.F.R. § 1-1.701-8 (1981); 32 C.F.R. § 3-603 .1(g) (1981).
22. 639 F.2d at 320. The suspension by GSA Commissioner Marshall resulted from an
investigation of selected building, guard and janitorial service contracts begun in 1979 by the
GSA's Office of Inspector General. The agency spends approximately $120 million annually
on about 300 guard and janitorial service contracts. Based on its investigation, the Inspector
General's Office concluded that Transco had billed the agency for nonexistent services, falsi-
fied the qualifications of its employees, and provided false statements to the Small Business
Administration in order to obtain a small business certification. These findings prompted
GSA's Inspector General to refer the matter to the Department of Justice for criminal prose-
cution. Government- Wide Debarment and Suspension Procedures.- Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Oversight of Government Management of the Senate Comm. on Governmental
Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 25-26 (1981) (statement of Howard Cox, Attorney, Office of
Special Projects, Office of Inspector General, General Services Administration) [hereinafter
cited as Hearings].
23. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari, app. D, Transco Security Inc. v. Freeman, 639 F.2d
318 (6th Cir. 1981).
24. 639 F.2d at 320.
25. Id
26. The hearing was requested pursuant to 41 C.F.R. § 1-1.605-4 (1981), which provides
that "[a] hearing may be requested upon receipt of the notice of suspension unless the basis
for suspension is an outstanding indictment against the firm or individual."
27. The Chief of the Special Prosecutions Division, United States Attorney's Office for
the Northern District of Illinois informed GSA that:
We are advised that Transco Security has requested access to substantial informa-
tion with regard to allegations that they engaged in fraudulent conduct relating to
their contract with GSA. Please be advised that we have initiated a criminal inves-
tigation of those allegations. To release such information as witness statements,
1982]
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also filed a motion for a preliminary injunction in federal district court
requesting the court to set aside the suspension.28
The district court denied injunctive relief, ruling that the plaintiffs had
failed to "demonstrate a substantial likelihood that they [would] eventu-
ally prevail on the merits,"29 and that GSA had "adequate evidence" to
suspend the firm in accordance with the applicable regulations.3" The
court went on to hold that the plaintiffs had not been, and were not likely
to be denied due process because even if an administrative hearing were
refused, they would still have the opportunity to present information or
arguments in opposition to the suspension in person, in writing or through
3'representation.3
On appeal, Judge Cornelia Kennedy of the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit held that the notice given Transco was constitu-
tionally defective because it did not advise the company which bills were
irregular or .how the caliber of its employees had been misrepresented.32
The court reversed and remanded the case to the district court to deter-
mine whether the opportunity to provide rebuttal evidence authorized
under the suspension regulations would have cured the inadequate notice
and provided the plaintiffs with a meaningful opportunity to present infor-
mation in opposition to the suspension. The court refused, however, to
hold that GSA's suspension procedures violated due process as a matter of
law, holding that an adversarial suspension hearing is not constitutionally
required.33
documents, records and other materials relating to this investigation, particularly
at this early date in the investigation, would prejudice the substantial interests of
our office and that investigation. We request that, in any proceedings relating to
Transco Security, you object to the release of such information to Transco Secur-
ity. If the court deems it appropriate, we have no objection to the court's in camera
review of such material.
Brief for the Respondents in Opposition, at 6-7, Transco Security Inc. v. Freeman, 639 F.2d
318 (6th Cir. 1981).
28. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari, at app. B, Transco Security Inc. v. Freeman, 639
F.2d 318 (6th Cir. 1981).
29. Transco Security Inc. v. Freeman, No. C-1-80-113, slip op. at 5 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 29,
1980).
30. Id at 4.
31. Id at 6. See 41 C.F.R. § 1-1.605-4(c) (1981).
32. 639 F.2d 318, 325. In the court's view, the government could have provided more
specific notice without disclosing its evidence.
33. Id at 322-23. The court reasoned that under most circumstances, the opportunity to
provide information in rebuttal will prevent suspension based on "mere suspicion, un-
founded allegation, or error." Id
[Vol. 31:731
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Transco petitioned the United States Supreme Court for certiorari 34 on
the ground that an eighteen month suspension without a hearing violated
its "liberty interest" guaranteed by the fifth amendment.3 The Supreme
Court denied Transco's petition for certiorari on October 5, 1981.36
This Note will examine Transco Security and the impact of the Sixth
Circuit's decision on government-wide debarment and suspension regula-
tions proposed by the Office of Federal Procurement Policy.37 It will
demonstrate that in upholding the constitutionality of GSA's suspension
regulations, the court has implicitly approved the new OFPP regulations
which reduce the judicially-mandated safeguards public contract bidders
currently enjoy. The final sections of the Note will address recent congres-
sional hearings on debarment and suspension and proposed legislation
that would accord a presumption of validity to individual agency debar-
ments and suspensions on a government-wide basis.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF DUE PROCESS RIGHTS FOR GOVERNMENT
CONTRACTORS
A. An Historical Perspective
Although the government has been using the sanctions of administrative
debarment and suspension for many years,38 historically, the due process
safeguards accompanying these sanctions have been minimal. In fact, de-
barments usually occurred without an adversary hearing and when the ba-
sis for the debarment was alleged criminal conduct, contractors were not
even notified of the reasons for the government's action.39 Similarly, prior
34. Transco Security Inc. v. Freeman, 639 F.2d 318 (6th Cir.),petition for cert. filed, 49
U.S.L.W. 3126 (U.S. April 22, 1981) (No. 80-1778).
35. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari, at 18, Transco Security Inc. v. Freeman, 639 F.2d
318 (6th Cir. 1981). Transco argued that the opportunity to present evidence in opposition to
the suspension did not provide a meaningful opportunity to be heard, especially when the
information is considered by the same administrative official who refused to provide ade-
quate notice without judicial intervention. Id at 14-15. Moreover, the "stigma" attached to
publication in and distribution of the suspension to other agencies through GSA's Consoli-
dated List of Current Administrative Debarments warranted an adversarial hearing to sat-
isfy due process. Id at 9. See 41 C.F.R. § 1-1.607(a) (1981). GSA is required to maintain a
consolidated list of debarred bidders, including the basis of the action, to be distributed to
all agencies on a semi-annual basis. Suspensions are also included routinely on the list but
the regulations do not require their inclusion.
36. 102 S. Ct. 101 (1981).
37. 46 Fed. Reg. 37,832 (1981).
38. The Comptroller General first sanctioned administrative debarments in 1928. 7
COMP. GEN. 547 (1928). Gantt & Panzer, The Government Blacklist.: Debarment and Suspen-
sion of Bidders on Government Contracts, 25 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 175, 185 (1957).
39. Gantt & Panzer, Debarment and Suspension of Bidders on Government Contracts and
19821
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to July 1956, the Armed Services Procurement Regulation (ASPR)4° did
not require contractors to be notified of suspension actions, much less the
grounds for the suspension. 41 Thus, contractors faced exclusion from fur-
ther contracting, termination of existing contracts, and withholding of
funds due under existing contracts without being apprised of the basis for
these sanctions.42
1. The Efforts of the Administrative Conference of the United States
In recognition of the potentially disastrous impact that debarment and
suspension may have on those who do business with the federal govern-
ment,43 the Administrative Conference of the United States (Conference),
undertook a comprehensive review of the existing debarment and suspen-
sion system in the early 1960's.' The committee on adjudication of claims
submitted a series of nine recommendations, all of which were adopted by
the full Conference.4 5 The committee's recommendations addressed its ba-
sic conclusion that "[e]xcept for a small percentage, this Governmental ac-
tion [of debarment or suspension] is taken without opportunity for an
adversary hearing and if based on suspected criminal conduct is generally
without being officially notified or informed of meaningful reasons, or op-
portunity to learn why.""
The Administrative Conference of the United States submitted its find-
the Adminitrative Conference ofhe United States, 5 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 89, n.39
(1963).
40. The Armed Services Procurement Regulation was redesignated the Defense Acqui-
sition Regulation in March 1978 as part of the government's efforts to give equal weight to
program management and contract administration, including budgeting, planning, and
managing agency's needs. See Department of Defense Directive 5000.35, Proposed Regula-
ions, Interim Amendments, GOV'T CONT. REP. (CCH) 79,072 (March 8, 1978).
41. See Gantt & Panzer, supra note 37, at 200 n.81.
42. See Miller, Administrative Discretion in the A ward ofFederal Contracts, 53 MICH. L.
REV. 781, 798 (1955).
43. The regulations expressly recognize the serious consequences of debarment and sus-
pension: "Suspension is a drastic action and, as such, shall not be based upon an unsup-
ported accusation." 41 C.F.R. § 1-1.605 (1981). It has also been recognized by the courts and
the Attorney General. See Home Bros. Inc. v. Laird, 463 F.2d 1268, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
The Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure reported that "the penalty
of blacklisting is so severe that its imposition may destroy a going business." Gantt & Pan-
zer, supra note 37, at 176 n.7.
44. Steadman, supra note 2, at 803 n.36.
45. Id The full Conference report, developed under the leadership of the then Depart-
ment of Defense General Counsel Cyrus R. Vance, is reprinted in SENATE SUBCOMM. ON
ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, SELECTED REPORTS OF THE ADMINISTRA-
TIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, S. Doc. No. 24, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 265-95
(1963).
46. Steadman, supra, note 2, at 803.
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ings and recommendations to the President in 1962. The centerpiece, and
most controversial, of the Conference's recommendations was that debar-
ment actions should be preceded by a "trial type hearing" before an im-
partial agency board or hearing examiner.47 The hearing should be
modeled after section 7 of the Administrative Procedure Act.4 The Con-
ference also recommended that suspensions be limited to eighteen months
and that they be accompanied by a finding of substantial grounds for non-
responsibility determinations as well as high-level review.4 9
The Conference's recommendations were well received by the Adminis-
tration. President Kennedy's directive to federal agencies to implement the
Conference's proposals was implemented by a Bureau of the Budget
Bulletin.5
2 The Commission on Government Procurement
The federal debarment and suspension process received renewed scru-
tiny in the early 1970's as part of the Commission on Government Pro-
curement's (COGP) monumental study of the federal procurement
process." The COGP report addressed both statutorily-mandated52 and
administrative debarments and suspensions. With respect to administrative
sanctions, it urged that uniform regulations be adopted that would guaran-
tee fair and expeditious resolution of these matters.
53
Interagency task groups were subsequently formed to review the COGP
47. Id at 804.
48. 5 U.S.C. § 556 (1976).
49. See Steadman, supra note 2, at 804 n.41. As discussed supra note 4, a finding of
contractor "responsibility" is a prerequisite to a contract award. The current regulations
define responsible contractors as those who: (1) have adequate financial resources to perform
the contract; (2) the ability to meet the contract delivery schedule; (3) a satisfactory record of
performance on prior federal contracts; and (4) a satisfactory record of integrity. 32 C.F.R.
§ 1-903.1 (1981), 41 C.F.R. § 1-1203-1 (1981).
50. Steadman, supra note 2, at 804 n.42.
51. Id at 805. The Commission on Government Procurement was created by Congress
in late 1969 to conduct a two-year study of the Federal Government's procurement policies
and procedures. Act of Nov. 26, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-129, §§ 1-9, 83 Stat. 269, as amended,
Act of July 9, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-47, 85 Stat. 102. The Commission issued its final report
on December 31, 1972, making 149 recommendations for improving the federal procure-
ment process. The Commission's major recommendation for the creation of an Office of
Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) was implemented in 1974. See Act of Aug. 30, 1974,
Pub. L. No. 93-400, 88 Stat. 769 (1974), as amended, Act of Oct. 10, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-83,
93 Stat. 648 (1979). OFPP has assumed the task of implementing the Commission's
recommendations.
52. For a discussion of the types of statutory debarments, see supra note 8 and accom-
panying text.
53. See I REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT 4, 68 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as the COGP REPORT].
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proposals and recommend implementation strategies for the Executive
Branch agencies.54 However, before the task group dealing with suspen-
sion and debarment could complete its review, the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia handed down its decision in Home
Brothers, Inc. v. Laird."
The Navy had suspended Home Brothers based on an indictment re-
turned against the company alleging unlawful actions in connection with
prior government contracts.56 Following the suspension, Home brought an
action in district court, seeking injunctive relief and a declaration that the
Navy had violated the law in issuing the suspension and refusing to award
a ship contract to Home, the apparent low bidder.
The district court issued a preliminary injunction,57 but the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed.58 The court
held that the Navy was justified in precluding Home from bidding on the
repair contract prior to a hearing on the suspension charges since the bid
was rejected within one month of the contractor's suspension. In the course
of its opinion, the court addressed the types of procedures which must ac-
company suspension actions in order to comply with due process. It indi-
cated that, while a temporary suspension for a "short period, not to exceed
one month" may be permitted without a hearing, more protracted suspen-
sions "require the Government to insure fundamental fairness to the con-
tractor whose economic life may depend on his ability to bid on
government contracts."5 9 In the court's view, fundamental fairness re-
54. Steadman, supra note 2, at 806 n.49.
55. 463 F.2d 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The Home Brothers case will be discussed more
fully infra in section B(2).
56. The Navy's suspension was based on allegations that Home had been giving gratui-
ties to Navy contract administrators and inspection personnel. Home Bros., Inc. v. Laird,
342-F. Supp. 703, 705 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 463 F.2d 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
57. Home Brothers, Inc. v. Laird, 342 F. Supp. 703 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 463 F.2d 1268 (D.C.
Cir. 1972). The district court ordered the government to stop performance on the ship repair
contract, but the court of appeals stayed the injunction pending its disposition of the case.
463 F.2d at 1269. Judge Aubrey C. Robinson concluded that the suspension was illegal
because it was not based on "adequate evidence" of improper behavior, and because the
regulations did not expressly prohibit gratuities. 342 F. Supp. at 707. The court further con-
cluded that the regulations violated the fifth amendment's due process requirements both as
written and as applied insofar as they purported to deny Home Brothers the opportunity to
bid on government contracts without benefit of notice or a hearing. The court criticized the
Armed Services Procurement Regulation (ASPR) procedures as inadequate because they
did not require specific notice of the charges or provide an opportunity to present evidence
and cross-examine adverse witnesses. ld at 708.
58. 463 F.2d at 1273. The appellate court concluded that Home was unlikely to prevail
on the merits. Id
59. Id at 1270-71. The financial ramifications of a suspension action may extend be-
yond the inability to compete for federal contracts during the suspension period. In this
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quired that the contractor be given specific notice of its alleged misconduct
and, in most cases, an opportunity to rebut those charges.60 However, the
court recognized that national security considerations or possible prejudice
to a prosecutorial action might justify withholding evidence from the
contractor.6 '
In response to the Home Brothers decision, the ASPR and the Federal
Procurement Regulations (FPR) were revised in mid- 197462 to require spe-
cific notice and an opportunity for a hearing provided the suspension was
not based on an outstanding indictment, and that a hearing would not ad-
versely affect ongoing Justice Department investigations.63
One year later, the COGP debarment and suspension task group issued
its findings.'M Although the task group made a number of recommenda-
tions for improving the debarment procedures, it concluded that the 1974
amendments to the suspension procedures satisfied due process
requirements.65
B. Wat Process is Due?- The Judicial Response
I Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co. and The Demise of the Privilege/Right
Distinction
The federal agencies have promulgated suspension and debarment regu-
regard the Comptroller General has held that agency financial officers must suspend con-
tractual payments when a reasonable suspicion of fraud exists. COMP. GEN. B-154628 (May
31, 1966). The government may also have the right to cancel a contract when fraud is dis-
closed, Acme Process Equip. Co. v. United States, 347 F.2d 509 (Ct. Cl. 1965), rev'don other
grounds, 385 U.S. 138 (1966). However, the regulations do not set forth standards for such
actions.
60. 463 F.2d at 1271.
61. Id
62. See Steadman, supra note 2, at 807-08.
63. The regulations have thus adopted the national security and prosecutorial excep-
tions recognized by the Horne Brothers court. They do not, however, reflect the court's indi-
cation that the contractor could ordinarily be provided with specific evidence of the grounds
for the suspension "without either tipping the Government's entire case, or even prema-
turely disclosing the identity of key witnesses." 463 F.2d at 1271. The regulations provide
that the notice shall state that:
(a) The suspension is based on (1) an outstanding indictment, or (2) adequate evi-
dence that the firm or individual has committed irregularities of a serious nature in
business dealings with the Government, or (3) adequate evidence of irregularities
which seriously reflect on the propriety of further dealings of the firm or individual
with the Government. (The notice shall identify the indictment or describe the
nature of the irregularities, in general terms, without disclosing the Government's
evidence).
41 C.F.R. § 1-1.605-3 (1980) (emphasis added).
64. 40 Fed. Reg. 22,318-19 (1975).
65. See Steadman, supra note 2, at 810 n.73.
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lations pursuant to their statutory mandate to award contracts to the lowest
bidder capable of meeting the contract requirements within the set delivery
schedule,66 and their judically recognized 67 power to consider bidders' rep-
utations in determining responsibility.
Due to the lack of pertinent statutory law, the federal courts have devel-
oped due process safeguards for government contractors involved in ad-
ministrative suspension actions.68 This evolution has been slow, largely
due to the Supreme Court's denial of standing to government contract bid-
ders in its 1940 decision in Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co. 69
In Lukens Steel, several producers of iron and steel sought to enjoin the
Secretary of Labor and various federal agencies from implementing a
wage determination made pursuant to the Walsh-Healey Public Contracts
Act.7 ° The manufacturers alleged that the Secretary had improperly con-
strued the statute in a manner which would cause them irreparable harm.7'
Because the statute contained no express provision authorizing judicial re-
view, the manufacturers' challenge was based on an alleged violation of
their right to bid on federal contracts and to be free from illegal interfer-
ence when negotiating with the government.72
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia agreed
that the Secretary of Labor had erroneously construed the statute,73 and
enjoined the Labor Secretary and other procurement agencies from giving
effect to the wage determination for the iron and steel industry. On appeal
the Supreme Court reversed.74
66. 10 U.S.C. § 2305(c) (1976) requires award to the "lowest responsible, responsive
bidder, price and other factors considered." There is no express statutory authority for sus-
pension actions. Miller, supra note 41, at 799. Neither the Armed Services Procurement Act,
10 U.S.C. §§ 2301-14 (1976) nor the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act, 40
U.S.C. §§ 471-544 (1976), recognize administrative suspension as a potential sanction to pro-
tect the government's interest when dealing with private contractors.
67. See L.P. Steuart & Bros., Inc. v. Bowles, 322 U.S. 398 (1944); United States v. Ad-
ams, 74 U.S. 463 (1868).
68. See Miller, supra note 41, at 802.
69. 310 U.S. 113 (1940).
70. 41 U.S.C. §§ 35-45 (1976). The Act applies to all government contracts in excess of
$10,000 for the manufacture or supply of materials, articles, or equipment. It requires the
contractor to certify that he will pay his workers minimum wages as determined by the
Secretary of Labor, and that no employee shall work in excess of 8 hours a day, 40 hours a
week in the absence of an agreement to the contrary between the contractor and the em-
ployee. Any such agreement is subject to approval by the Secretary of Labor.
71. 310 U.S. at 124.
72. Id at 115.
73. Lukens Steel Co. v. Perkins, 107 F.2d 627, 634 (D.C. Cir. 1939), rev'd, 310 U.S. 113
(1940).
74. 310 U.S. 113 (1940). As a result, the statute was suspended for more than a year
pending completion of the litigation. Id at 117.
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Writing for the Court, Justice Black held that the contractors lacked
standing to challenge the validity of the Secretary's action, because the
statute was enacted solely for the government's benefit, and it conferred no
enforceable rights on government bidders.75 He reasoned that the Govern-
ment has the unrestricted right to do business with whomever it pleases
and under whatever terms and conditions it chooses.76 The Court con-
cluded that, absent congressional authorization, judicial review of the gov-
ernment's purchasing power would be improper."
The Court's decision in Lukens Steel was based on the now discredited
distinction between rights and privileges for identifying entitlement to due
process safeguards.78 Following the demise of the right-privilege doctrine,
the lower courts became increasingly willing to entertain challenges by dis-
appointed bidders based on their economic interest in doing business with
the government. 79 In essence, courts began to conclude that the govern-
ment's power to dictate contractual terms carried with it a corollary duty to
exercise this power in accordance with concepts of fundamental fairness.8 °
Some forty years later the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia took the lead in distinguishing the Supreme Court's Luk-
ens Steel decision in a line of debarment-suspension cases beginning with
Copper Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Campbell.81 In Copper Plumbing, the
75. The plaintiffs were not permitted to invoke "mere possible injury to the public" as
grounds for challenging the Navy's allegedly unlawful procurement practices. 310 U.S. at
132.
76. Justice Black stated that "[like private individuals and businesses, the Government
enjoys the unrestricted power to produce its own supplies, to determine those with whom it
will deal and to fix the terms and conditions upon which it will make needed purchases." Id
at 127.
77. Id
78. See Miller, supra note 41, at 802. See also Note, Doing Business With Government:
Are Prospective Suppliers Entitled To Procedural Due Process?, 55 CHI.[-]KENT L. REv. 497,
499-504 (1979). During the first part of the 20th century, the Supreme Court's due process
decisions differentiated between rights and privileges, reasoning that the state's power to
grant a privilege carried a corollary right to withhold or condition it. Eg., Packard v.
Bantan, 264 U.S. 140, 145 (1924). Gradually, the Court began to recognize due process inter-
ests in matters that had previously been thought to be merely privileges. Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254 (1970). And in Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971), the Supreme
Court expressly rejected the right-privilege dichotomy.
79. See, e.g., Cincinnati Elec. Corp. v. Kleppe, 509 F.2d 1080 (6th Cir. 1975); Hayes
Int'l Corp. v. McLucas, 509 F.2d 247 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 864 (1975); William F.
Wilke, Inc. v. Department of Army, 485 F.2d 180 (4th Cir. 1973); Merriam v. Kunzig, 476
F.2d 1233 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 911 (1973); Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer,
424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
80. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Freeman, 334 F.2d 570 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
81. 290 F.2d 368 (D.C. Cir. 1961). The majority of procurement-related suits are
brought in the District of Columbia federal courts because of the accessibility of data and
the agency heads within the District of Columbia. Steadman, supra note 2, at 806 n.50.
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plaintiffs challenged a Department of Labor regulation which barred them
from receiving federal contracts for three years based on violations of the
Eight Hour Laws 2 and resulted in its placement on the Comptroller Gen-
eral's debarred bidders list.8 3 The district court denied the plaintiffs' mo-
tion for injunctive relief, holding that they lacked standing to challenge the
debarment action.84 The court of appeals concluded that the company had
standing to challenge the regulation,85 but held that the debarment was
valid.86
The court distinguished Lukens Steel 87 on the ground that it had in-
volved a challenge to the general application of a procurement statute
which applied to all industry members nationwide, unlike the instant case
where an individual injury had been alleged.88 The court recognized that
while contractors do not have a right to dictate the terms on which they
will do business with the government, they do have a right to receive equal
treatment with other bidders under applicable procurement statutes. Dep-
rivation of this right entitles contractors to judicial review under section 10
of the Administrative Procedure Act.89
The principles enunciated in Copper Plumbing were extended to admin-
istrative suspensions in Gonzales v. Freeman.9 In this case, the plaintiffs
82. 37 Stat. 137 (1912), as amended, 40 U.S.C. §§ 324-326 (1958); 40 U.S.C. §§ 324-326
(1976). The current version of the statute is entitled the Contract Work Hours and Safety
Standards Act. Copper Plumbing, 290 F.2d at 370. As a penalty for violation of the statute,
the company paid the government $955 as required under the contract and reimbursed its
employees for backpay as mandated by the statute. Id.
83. 290 F.2d at 370. The regulations provided:
that whenever a contractor or subcontractor is found by the Secretary or Agency
Head to be in aggravated or willful violation of the overtime pay provisions of
certain acts relating to federally financed and assisted construction, other than the
Davis-Bacon Act, such contractor or subcontractor, or any firm, corporation, part-
nership, or association in which it has a substantial interest 'shall be ineligible for a
period of three years (from the date of the publication by the Comptroller General
of the name or names of said contractor or subcontractor on the ineligible list as
provided below) to receive any contracts subject to the statutes listed in § 5.1,'
which include the Eight Hour Laws.
Id at 371 (citations omitted).
84. Id at 370.
85. Id
86. Id at 373.
87. 310 U.S. 113 (1940).
88. The court noted that the debarment sanction was in addition to the monetary penal-
ties provided by the statute. At the time of the listing, the firm conducted approximately 70
percent of its business with the government. 290 F.2d at 370.
89. Id at 370-71. The standard of review is very narrow; plaintiffs must show that the
government's actions were arbitrary and capricious. Keco Indus. Inc. v. United States, 492
F.2d 1200 (Ct. Cl. 1974); Stanko Packing Co. v. Bergland, 489 F. Supp. 947 (D.D.C. 1980).
90. 334 F.2d 570 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
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challenged their temporary debarment by the Commodity Credit Corpora-
tion (CCC)91 for alleged misuse of official export inspection certificates,
arguing that the CCC's action was not authorized by statute or regulation;
that it was imposed without procedural rules specifying the grounds for the
suspension; and that they were not given notice and a meaningful opportu-
nity to refute the charges against them.92
The district court granted the government's motion for summary judg-
ment, but the court of appeals reversed, holding that a justiciable contro-
versy existed and that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge the CCC's
action. The court conceded that contractors have no legal right to contract
with the government, but stated that contractors currently performing gov-
ernment contracts are in a different position from bidders who are merely
seeking federal contracts.93 It pointed out that the interruption of such an
existing relationship between the contractor and the government may have
grave economic consequences for the contractor.94 The court held that the
government may not exercise its procurement powers arbitrarily or pre-
clude a contractor from challenging the evidence against him before he is
officially barred from receiving government contracts.95 Accordingly, the
court concluded that agencies must adopt and publish standards and pro-
cedures governing such actions to assure uniform minimum fairness to all
parties. 96 These procedures should include notice of specific charges
against the contractor, an opportunity to cross-examine adverse witnesses
and a decision supported by an administrative record. 97 Despite its will-
91. The Commodity Credit Corporation Act, Act of June 29, 1948, 62 Stat. 1070 (1948)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 714 (1976)), created the Commodity Credit Corporation
(CCC) within the Department of Agriculture for the purpose of stabilizing, supporting, and
protecting farm income and prices and maintaining an adequate supply and orderly distri-
bution of agricultural commodities.
92. 334 F.2d at 573. The plaintiffs had been summarily suspended for a period of two
and one-half years pending a Department of Justice investigation, and later were formally
suspended for a period of five years. The notice of suspension stated no grounds for the
action. Id at 572 n.3. The plaintiffs further alleged that government contracting constituted
a substantial portion of their business and that as a result of the suspension, they had lost
more than $100,000 in profits. Id at 573. The government contended, inter alia, that doing
business with the CCC was not a legally protectible right and that Congress had expressly
precluded judicial review of CCC actions. Id.
93. Id at 574.
94. Id
95. 1A. The court so concluded despite its recognition that the authority to debar or
suspend "irresponsible, defaulting, or dishonest contractors ... is inherent and necessarily
incidental to the effective administration of the statutory scheme." Id at 576-77.
96. Id at 578-79. Since it concluded that the CCC's summary action was not authorized
by applicable statutes or regulations, it found it unnecessary to reach the plaintiffs constitu-
tional due process claims. Id. at 579-80.
97. Id at 578.
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ingness to recognize far-reaching procedural rights for contractors, the
court also conceded that a "summary debarment" in the nature of a "tem-
porary suspension" might be warranted for a reasonable period of time
pending investigation."
2. The Home Brothers Watershed
Having established that the government must act reasonably and in ac-
cordance with principles of fundamental fairness when it curtails legiti-
mate private (contractor) interests, the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit considered the scope of procedural pro-
tections that must be accorded to debarred or suspended bidders in Home
Brothers, Inc. v. Laird.99
As previously discussed, o the plaintiff in Home Brothers sought to en-
join the performance of a contract by another contractor, after it had been
temporarily suspended pending a Navy investigation of contract impropri-
eties. "' District Court Judge Aubrey C. Robinson had granted Home's
request for an injunction, 0 2 but the court of appeals reversed and re-
manded, holding that the government must be allowed a "reasonable
time" after notification of suspension to conduct a hearing proceeding. 0 3
Despite its reversal, the appellate court agreed with the lower court's
conclusion that there were serious questions regarding the fairness of pro-
cedures utilized by the goverment in suspending contractors.'°4 The court
conceded that a hearing might not be required prior to a "temporary sus-
pension" not exceeding one month, however, lengthier suspensions should
require a prior hearing to insure due process. 10 5 The court also recognized
that national security or potential prejudice to an ongoing prosecution
might justify nondisclosure of the government's "adequate evidence" to
98. Id at 579.
99. 463 F.2d 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
100. See supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text.
101. 342 F. Supp. at 705. See supra note 55.
102. Id at 708.
103. 463 F.2d at 1272.
104. Id at 1269.
105. Relying on Gonzales, the court concluded that the government is required to give a
contractor specific notice of at least some of the charges alleged against it and an opportu-
nity to rebut those charges when the administrative procedures contemplate suspension for a
period of a year or more. Id at 1270-71. It should be noted that Home Brothers directs only
that an opportunity to be heard be provided to the suspended party. A waiver of this right
may be either express, or inferred from the conduct of the parties, as for example, where the
parties do not press for their right to a hearing and through negotiations with the govern-
went attempt to resolve the matter through nonadjudicatory channels. Adamo Wrecking
Co. v. Department of Hous. & Urban Dev., 414 F. Supp. 877, 879 (D.D.C. 1976).
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the contractor. " Even in these cases, however, the contractor must be pro-
vided protection through a formal determination by a government official
that significant injury would result if a hearing were held.' Furthermore,
courts may assess the adequacy of the government's evidence in the event
of a judicial challenge by an in camera inspection of at least a portion of
the evidence held by the government. 0 8
In Art-Metal-USA, Inc. v. Solomon,1°9 the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia assessed the specific procedural safeguards
that must be followed before a contractor can be blacklisted by a federal
agency.110 Unlike the court's prior decisions which had involved formal
debarment or suspension proceedings, Art-Metal involved what has come
to be known as "de facto" debarment."' Art-Metal, the federal govern-
ment's largest furniture supplier, alleged that it was being denied contracts
under which it was the lowest bidder, because of a series of newspaper
articles which charged the company with supplying inferior products and
engaging in fraudulent dealings with the General Services Administra-
tion.'12 GSA officials never formally accused the company of criminal or
fraudulent acts and formal debarment or suspension proceedings were
never instituted against the contractor.1 13
The court held that the agency's finding of nonresponsibility coupled
with suspension of Art-Metal's contracts pending completion of an investi-
gation was tantamount to suspension of the company without procedural
due process. 14 While recognizing that a contractor may be temporarily
106. The court defined "adequate evidence" as similar to "probable cause" necessary for
an arrest, a search warrant, or a preliminary hearing, i.e., more than uncorroborated suspi-
cion or accusation. 463 F.2d at 1271.
107. Id at 1272. A high level official, such as the assistant secretary of an agency, must
be presumed, in the absence of contrary evidence, to act in the agency's best interests. 414 F.
Supp. at 879.
108. 463 F.2d at 1272.
109. 473 F. Supp. I (D.D.C. 1978).
110. Id at 4.
111. A constructive or de facto debarment may occur in the event of repeated rulings of
nonresponsibility. Myers & Myers, Inc. v. United States Postal Serv., 527 F.2d 1252 (2d Cir.
1975). The Comptroller General has held that formal debarment or suspension procedures
must be invoked as soon as practicable following a determination of nonresponsibility to
preclude agencies from repeatedly disregarding otherwise low bids without giving the bidder
an opportunity to be heard. 43 COMP. GEN. 140 (1963). See R. NASH, JR. & J. CIBINIC, JR.,
FEDERAL PROCUREMENT LAW 192 (3d ed. 1977).
112. 473 F. Supp. at 3 nn.l-2. High level officials within GSA, including then GSA Ad-
ministrator Jay Solomon, did admit, however, that their primary reason for not awarding
contracts to the company involved "public relations" in the face of an ongoing investigation
of GSA's procurement practices. Id at 7.
113. Id at5.
114. Id at6.
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suspended pending an investigation under "extreme situations such as
those involving national security,"" 5 it firmly rejected the government's
argument that Art-Metal's rights be subordinated for public relations rea-
sons in the face of GSA's attempt to curtail widespread corruption within
the agency. 16
Although the courts had previously recognized that federal contractors
possess a cognizable liberty interest in dealing with the government, the
basis for this interest was not fully articulated until Old Dominion Dairy
Products, Inc. v. Secretary of Defense.1 7 In this case, a Department of De-
fense (DOD) contractor was denied two government contracts based on
the contracting officer's determination that it had "knowingly and substan-
tially overbilled the Government" under prior contracts," 8 which led to a
determination of nonresponsibility. "9 The company was subsequently for-
mally suspended under Defense Acquisition Regulation (DAR) section 1-
605.20 Old Dominion sought both injunctive and declaratory relief charg-
ing that the agency's action was arbitrary and that Old Dominion had been
denied due process of law under the fifth amendment because it had not
been given notice or an opportunity to contest the agency's nonresponsibil-
ity determination.
The district court ruled in the government's favor,' 2' but the court of
appeals reversed and remanded. It found that the contractor's interest in
preserving its reputation plus its interest in not being foreclosed from fu-
ture government contracts constituted a cognizable "liberty" interest under
the fifth amendment. 122 While the court agreed that the contracting officer
115. Id
116. Id Thus, the court concluded that the public interest is not served when the goal of
honest, efficient government is sought to be achieved through unlawful means or when
blacklisting is based "not on evidence" but on the premise that to do otherwise "wouldn't
look very good." Id (citation omitted). The court added that "our system of laws does not
operate on the principle of the Queen in Alice in Wonderland-'sentence first-verdict after-
wards.' It requires the evidence to come first." Id at 8.
117. 631 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Accord, Conset Corp. v. Community Serv. Admin.,
655 F.2d 1291 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
118. 631 F.2d at 955.
119. Id
120. Id at 959.
121. Old Dominion Dairy Prod., Inc. v. Brown, 471 F. Supp. 300 (D.D.C. 1979), rev'd,
631 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
122. 631 F.2d at 966. In reaching this result, the court relied on the Supreme Court's
decision in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). The Roth Court considered the
circumstances under which the refusal of a public university to reemploy a nontenured uni-
versity instructor invoked due process "liberty" interests. The Supreme Court concluded
that a mere refusal to rehire without notice and a hearing did not violate due process; how-
ever, it recognized that "where a person's good name, reputation, honor or integrity is at
stake because of what the government is doing to him, notice and an opportunity to be heard
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reasonably could have concluded that Old Dominion had overcharged the
government,1 23 it held that the district court had erred in holding that Old
Dominion did not have a due process right to notice and at least a minimal
opportunity to respond to charges against it.1 24 The court further held that
the government's after-the-fact invocation of formal suspension proceed-
ings did not cure the constitutional violation. 2-
Turning to the issue of what process is due, the court of appeals noted
that the Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge126 established three factors
to be considered in identifying the specific parameters of due process: (1)
the private interest involved; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of the
individual interest and the additional or substitute procedural safeguards
available; and (3) the government's interest, and the administrative bur-
dens that alternative procedural requirements would entail. 27 Under this
test, the court concluded that a "full blown hearing" would impair the
government's ability to conduct its business. Nevertheless, the contractor
has a right to be notified of the specific charges against him and a chance
to present his side of the story. 128 Although the court did not rely on
are essential." Id at 573 (quoting Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971)). See
also Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976); Larry v.
Lawler, 605 F.2d 954 (7th Cir. 1978). The appellate court noted that here there was no
problem with lack of publication of the damaging characterization as recognized by the
Supreme Court in Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976).
123. 631 F.2d at 960. The court found that the contracting officer's nonresponsibility
determination was rational. Thus, the court dismissed the company's due process claims
because they were "without merit." Id
124. Id. at 968.
125. Id at 966-67. The district court had found persuasive the fact that the agency's
subsequent initiation of formal suspension proceedings would give the contractor an oppor-
tunity to clear its name. 471 F. Supp. at 303. However, following the district court's decision,
Old Dominion's request for a hearing pursuant to the suspension regulations was denied.
631 F.2d at 959 n.13.
126. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
127. 631 F.2d at 967 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)). In so
holding, the appellate court distinguished the Supreme Court's decision in Cafeteria & Res-
taurant Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961), in which it held that the plaintiff, an
employee of a government contractor operating a cafeteria at the Naval Gun Factory in
Washington, D.C., could constitutionally be excluded from the Gun Factory's premises
without a hearing and notice of the specific grounds for exclusion. In reaching this result, the
court relied on the historically unquestioned power of the commanding officer to exclude
civilians from his command, coupled with the fact that the plaintiff would not be foreclosed
from government employment other than at the facility in question. 631 F.2d at 965-66.
128. 463 F.2d 1268. The court was apparently referring to the right, provided in the sus-
pension regulations, to present information or argument in opposition to the suspension in
person, in writing, or through representation. 41 C.F.R. § 1-1.605-4(e) (1981). Old Dominion
had not requested a formal hearing at any time during the litigation, but had merely asserted
its right
to be notified of the allegations against its integrity, to present immediately in
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Supreme Court precedent in determining what type of notice Old Domin-
ion should have received, its analysis basically mirrored that set forth by
the Supreme Court in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. ,29 in
which the Court stressed that notice must be sufficiently specific to permit
adequate preparation for an impending proceeding. 30
C. Current Suspension Regulations
After the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia's
decision in Home Brothers, GSA drafted new suspension regulations cov-
ering both the issues of notice and hearing prior to suspension. 3' These
regulations, currently in force, require that notice be given "upon suspen-
sion." The notice must state that the suspension is based on an outstanding
indictment or adequate evidence that the firms's dealings with the govern-
ment reflect serious irregularities. ' 32 The agency is required to describe the
nature of the alleged irregularities "in general terms" so as not to disclose
the government's evidence.' 33
The decision to grant a hearing is discretionary under the Federal Pro-
curement Regulations. A contractor may "request" a hearing upon receipt
of a suspension notice,' 34 and such a request "will be considered" unless
the suspension is based on an outstanding indictment or advice from either
the Justice or Labor Department that a hearing would prejudice their col-
lateral proceedings against the contractor. 135 However, the regulations im-
pose no affirmative duty on the agency to grant a hearing.' 36 The
whatever time was available, facts and arguments to persuade the Contracting Of-
ficer that the allegations were without merit, and thereby have the opportunity to
preserve the awards which, absent the allegations, would have been made to it.
631 F.2d at 968 (quoting Appellant's Reply Brief, at 7, Transco Security Inc. v. Freeman,
639 F.2d 318 (6th Cir. 1981)).
129. 339 U.S. 306 (1950). See Note, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 90 (1981), criticizing the Old
Dominion court's conclusion that corporations possess due process liberty interests, and
questioning the necessity of reliance on constitutional grounds in deciding the case.
130. 339 U.S. at 314.
131. Steadman, supra note 2, at 807-08.
132. 41 C.F.R. § 1-1.605-3(a) (1981). The regulations do not define "adequate evidence,"
however, this evidentiary standard has been analogized to "probable cause" by the courts.
See Home Brothers, 463 F.2d at 1271. See also supra note 13.
133. 41 C.F.R. § 1-1.605-3(a) (1981).
134. 41 C.F.R. § 1-1.605-4(a) (1981).
135. 41 C.F.R. §§ 1-1.605-3(f), 1-1.605-4(a) (1981). Although routine limits for filing a
hearing request are set forth in the regulations, at least one court has held that a contractor's
failure to press for a hearing because of ultimately unsuccessful settlement negotiations with
the agency resulted in a waiver of the contractor's hearing rights. Adamo Wrecking Co., 414
F. Supp. at 877. See supra note 104.
136. See 41 C.F.R. § 1-1.605-3(f) (1981).
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regulations do not define what type of hearing will be held if the hearing
request is granted, 37 yet, at least one board of contract appeals has held
that there is no right to confront adverse witnesses in a suspension
hearing.
138
Home Brothers approved suspension without a hearing in the event that
the hearing would adversely affect other proceedings against the contrac-
tor, and the regulations reflect this exception.' 39 If denied a hearing, the
contractor is given the option of submitting "any information or argument
in opposition to the suspension. . in person, in writing, or through repre-
sentation."' 4 ° This information is then considered by the head of the
agency or his authorized representative. Absent "prosecutive action" by
the Justice Department, the suspension must end after twelve months. If
an Assistant Attorney General requests a continuance, however, the sus-
pension may be extended for an additional six months.' 4'
Government agencies are given considerable discretion over the length
of a contractor's suspension, and they may modify a suspension in the in-
terest of the government 42 or may tailor it to the organizational structure
137. The discretionary nature of the hearing provisions in the Federal Procurement Reg-
ulations (FPR) must be contrasted with those provided for the military agencies under the
Defense Acquisition Regulations (DAR). DAR § 1-605-2(b)(2) (32 C.F.R. § 1-605-2(b)(2)
(1981)), states that a hearing "shall" be granted when requested if the basis for suspension
does not involve potential criminal or civil prosecution.
138. Dale J. Leavitt, AGBCA No, 77-135, 79-1 BCA - 13,802. But see Sahni v. Depart-
ment of Hous. & Urban Dev., 478 F. Supp. 882 (D.D.C. 1979), holding that the Department
of Housing and Urban Development Board of Contract Appeals (HUD BCA) erred in ex-
cluding a contactor's countervailing evidence in a suspension hearing. As the courts more
clearly delineated debarment-suspension hearing requirements, numerous government
agencies have delegated the authority to conduct such hearings (or review debarment ac-
tions) to their respective administrative boards of contract appeals. HUD BCA issues more
debarment-suspension decisions than any other administrative board (about 60 per year).
[1979] 21 Gov'T CONTRACTOR - 173 (FED. Pun.). However, these decisions must be care-
fully reviewed before they are relied upon by counsel since the HUD regulations governing
debarment and suspension are not identical to its DAR and FPR counterparts. See, e.g., 24
C.F.R. § 24.4 (1981) (debarments may last five years); 24 C.F.R. § 24.7 (1981) (relating to
formal debarment hearing procedures, including cross-examination). The Department of
Defense does not publicize its debarment or suspension determinations, so no interpreta-
tions construing the regulations are available from the military agencies.
139. See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
140. 41 C.F.R. § 1-1.605-4(e) (1981). If a hearing is denied based on possible impairment
of ongoing criminal proceedings, the contractor is so notified in writing within 20 days of the
receipt of the request. Id
141. 41 C.F.R. § 1-1.605-2(a) (1981). Thus, a firm may be suspended for a year and a
half before the agency determines whether a reason for debarment exists.
142. 41 C.F.R. § 1-1.605(b) (1981). Appropriate grounds for modification of the debar-
ment period include: "newly discovered material evidence, reversal of a conviction, bona
fide change of ownership or management, or the elimination of the causes for which the
debarment was imposed." Id See, e.g., Lawrence Bursten, HUD BCA No. 81-555-D9, 81-1
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of the contractor.' 43 Finally, administrative agencies may suspend a con-
tractor who has been suspended by another agency,'" but in doing so they
must independently follow applicable regulations.
145
II. TJANsco SECURITY, INC. OF OHIO: A CRITICAL VIEW
In Transco Security, Inc. of Ohio v. Freeman'46 the Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit was faced with a case of first impression.1 47 It was asked
to decide whether the regulatory provision permitting a hearing to be de-
nied in the interest of protecting an ongoing criminal investigation,1 48 and
authorizing a contractor to present "information or argument in opposi-
tion to the suspension . . . in person, in writing, or through representa-
tion,"' 149 provided a hearing for purposes of constitutional due process. 50
The General Services Administration had denied Transco a hearing based
BCA 1 15,047 (reinstatement prior to end of debarment period justified based on new evi-
dence); Hue Chemical Sales, Inc., GSBCA No. 5661-D, 80-2 BCA 14,679 (debarment term
shortened based on firm's cooperation with government investigation).
143. 41 C.F.R. § 1-1.605-2(b) (1981). For instance, an agency has discretion to suspend
all known affiliates of the suspended concern, 41 C.F.R. § 1-1.605-2(b)(1) (1981), or it may
suspend only those subsidiaries or divisions which it believes were a party to the culpable
conduct. See id at § 1- 1.605-2(b)(2). Further, "criminal, fraudulent or seriously improper"
conduct of an individual may be imputed to the firm for whom he is employed. Id at § 1-
1.605-2(b)(3). The decision to suspend affiliates is made on a case-by-case basis, 41 C.F.R.
§ 1-1.603-2(b)(2) (1981). Nevertheless, the possibility clearly exists that a corporate em-
ployee's actions may result in the suspension of the entire business entity. See The Mayer
Co., Inc. and Carl A. Mayer, Jr., HUD BCA No. 81-544-DI, 82-1 BCA 15,473. It should be
noted, however, that if an agency proposes to debar or suspend a contractor's "affiliates,"
these entities must be accorded the same procedural due process rights accorded to the par-
ent company. For instance, in Ira F. Gassman, Vinyline Prod., Associated Vinyline Prod.,
Inc., GSBCA No. D-3, 79-1 BCA 13,771, the General Services Administration attempted
to debar two firms for submitting false claims to the agency. The General Services Board of
Contract Appeals, however, held that the debarment was ineffective since the firms had not
received notice of the debarment proceedings. Notice had been given to the individual who
had been convicted of submitting the false claims, but since he had severed all ties with the
firms, the notice was ineffective as to them.
144. 41 C.F.R. § 1-1.605-1(b) (1981).
145. The Comptroller General has held that an ongoing suspension by one agency does
not automatically result in government-wide suspension; rather, it merely provides a basis
for imposing a concurrent suspension. Opalack & Co., B-194388, 79-2 CPD 112 (1979).
Unlike reciprocal debarment, which may be based entirely on the original debarring
agency's record, each agency must follow its own regulations in making a suspension and in
providing the contractor with procedural rights.
146. 639 F.2d 318 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 101 (1981).
147. Transco Security marked the first time in GSA's history that a hearing was denied to
a contractor on a preindictment suspension. See Hearings, supra note 21, at 27.
148. 41 C.F.R. § 1-1.605-4(b) (1981).
149. 41 C.F.R. § 1-1.605-4(e) (1981).
150. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Old
Dominion Dairy Prod., Inc. v. Secretary of Defense, 631 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1980), specifi-
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on advice from the Department of Justice that a hearing would prejudice
its collateral criminal investigation of Transco's federal guard service con-
tracts. In addition, the Department of Justice alleged that Transco was at-
tempting to use the administrative hearing process as a means of obtaining
pretrial discovery otherwise unavailable to criminal defendants."'5
The Transco plaintiffs challenged both the adequacy of the notice ac-
corded them and the absence of a "meaningful opportunity" to rebut the
charges against them. The plaintiffs alleged two separate violations of their
due process rights. First, they contended that the GSA suspension regula-
tions violate due process to the extent that they can prohibit companies
from contracting with the government for up to eighteen months without
being afforded a hearing to contest the allegations against them. Secondly,
they argued that the suspension notices issued by GSA were so ambiguous
as to constitute no notice at all.'
52
Before addressing the plaintiffs' substantive claims, the court considered
whether Transco possessed a cognizable constitutional interest in doing
business with the government. The court conceded that the right to bid on
federal contracts does not constitute a property interest because procure-
ment statutes are enacted solely for the government's benefit.' 53 Neverthe-
less, as recognized by the District of Columbia Circuit in Old Dominion, a
bidder's liberty interest is affected when the bidder is denied a contract
based on allegations of fraud or dishonesty. 154 Having concluded that
Transco did in fact have a protected liberty interest affected by GSA's alle-
gations of overcharges and misrepresentation, the court addressed the na-
ture of the hearing which must be held.' 55
Judge Kennedy recognized that the scope of due process requires bal-
ancing the governmental and private interests involved. 156 In the context
of debarment and suspension, the court noted that the government's inter-
ests are two-fold: first, its proprietary right to purchase services, and sec-
ond, its interest in protecting the integrity of a possible criminal
prosecution. 57 These interests, in turn, must be balanced against the con-
cally did not decide whether or not a "formal" or 'some form of hearing" would be re-
quired in the case of an actual suspension. Id at 961 n.17 & 968 n.30.
151. See 639 F.2d at 324.
152. Id. at 320.
153. Id at 321.
154. Id
155. Id at 322.
156. Id The court relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Cafeteria & Restaurant
Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961), discussed supra note 126.
157. 639 F.2d at 322. The government's alleged proprietary interest in "not dealing with
a contractor which it has probable cause to suspect of wrongdoing," id at 324, pales in view
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tractor's liberty interest in dealing with the government.'58
In the court's view, the suspension regulations successfully balance these
competing concerns by providing review of the suspension decision by a
high-level administrator in accordance with articulated standards, and by
allowing the contractor to present information or argument in opposition
to the suspension. Unlike Home Brothers, 59 where the plaintiff was given
no opportunity to challenge its suspension, the current regulations do pro-
vide for rebuttal. The court stated that the right currently provided in the
regulations to present information in opposition to the suspension action to
the head of the agency or his authorized representative cures the proce-
dural defects criticized by the District of Columbia Circuit in Home Broth-
ers.160 Nevertheless, the court recognized that this opportunity is
meaningful onl if the contractor receives notice that is sufficiently specific
to enable collection and presentation of relevant rebuttal evidence.' 6 '
In light of this finding, the court assessed the notice provided to Transco
by the GSA. It determined that the notice was constitutionally deficient
both because it was initially in general terms, and because it was later
modified to include additional charges. The court stated that proper notice
is essential if the opportunity to present information in opposition is to
have any meaning, 62 especially where, as here, no adversarial hearing is
provided. 163 In determining what constitutes proper notice, the court relied
on Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. ,164 where the Supreme
Court stated that due process requires "notice reasonably calculated, under
all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the
action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections."' 165 No-
tice apprises the contractor of the government's allegations so that it may
prepare an adequate defense. 66
The Sixth Circuit determined that the general notice provided to
Transco did not meet established constitutional mandates. Although the
of the fact that GSA continued to do business with Transco for eight months following its
suspension. Petitioners' Brief for Certiorari at 21, Transco Security Inc. v. Freeman, 639
F.2d 318 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 101 (1981).
158. 639 F.2d at 322.
159. 463 F.2d at 1268.
160. 639 F.2d at 322.
161. Id at 323.
162. Id
163. Id at 324.
164. 339 U.S. 306 (1950). See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
165. 339 U.S. at 314.
166. 639 F.2d at 323 (citing Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1
(1978)). Similar conclusions were reached by the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia in Home Brothers and Old Dominion.
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plaintiffs were notified that their suspension was based on billing irregular-
ities, they were not told the approximate dates of the misbillings or even
under which contracts the alleged overcharges had occurred. In addition,
Transco had no way of knowing, based on the notice given, how or to what
extent the caliber of its employees had been misrepresented.
167
At the time of its suspension, Transco was performing numerous con-
tracts at various GSA locations throughout the United States. 168 The court
reasoned that it would be almost impossible for the company to marshal
information to refute such a general charge unless it was at least notified of
what contracts were allegedly overbilled and the approximate date of those
misbillings. 169 The court also found GSA's allegation that Transco had
misrepresented the caliber of its employees constitutionally defective be-
cause it failed to state whether qualification or performance misrepresenta-
tions were involved, and because it did not state whether the charge
applied to employees of Transco-Ohio or to employees of the defunct
Transco-Delaware Corporation.
70
Relying on Horne Brothers and Old Dominion, the court concluded that
Transco should have been given as specific notice of the charges against it
as possible if the opportunity to submit rebuttal information were to have
any meaning.' 7 ' The court recognized the government's need to protect the
integrity of its investigation by concealing its evidence. However, it
pointed out that this interest and the contractor's interest in obtaining ade-
quate notice need not be mutually exclusive. 172 Transco could have been
advised which bills were irregular and how the caliber of its employees
had been misrepresented without tipping the government's evidentiary
hand. Finally, the court noted that in camera inspection by the lower court
may be appropriate to determine whether the contractor has been afforded
as specific notice as possible where the government asserts prejudice to an
ongoing criminal investigation.' 73 Through an in camera inspection, the
court may review all of the government's evidence, and separate docu-
ments which could be disclosed "from those that must remain confidential
in order to maintain the integrity of the government's legitimate
167. 639 F.2d at 323.
168. Id See also supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
169. 639 F.2d at 323.
170. Id
171. Id. at 324.
172. Id
173. Id at 325. In camera inspection of at least some of the government's evidence was
recognized expressly as a possible means of precluding abuse of discretion by suspending
officials by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Home Broth-
ers. 463 F.2d at 1272 & n.9.
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interests." 74
The court concluded that once an adequate evidentiary showing is
made, if sufficiently specific notice is provided to contractors under the
guidelines discussed above, and they are given the opportunity to present
information in opposition to an administrative suspension, no violation of
due process will exist. This will generally preclude suspension based on
"mere suspicion, unfounded allegation, or clear error." '175
A. Validity of the Decision
In Transco, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit became the first
appellate court to pass on the constitutionality of the federal suspension
regulations. Although Transco was the first company in GSA's history to
be suspended without a hearing prior to a formal indictment, 76 it is not
likely to be the last in view of the court's approval of the summary suspen-
sion provided in the regulations. 177 It is therefore important to assess not
only the result reached by the court, but also its rationale, and the ques-
tions that remain unanswered in the wake of its decision.
The court correctly held that the notice provided to Transco was consti-
tutionally inadequate, but it refused to hold that the FPR notice require-
ments per se violated constitutional due process. The applicable regu-
lations merely provide that the notice shall "identify the indictment or de-
scribe the nature of the irregularities, in general terms, without disclosing
the Government's evidence."'17  The regulations thus do not meet basic
constitutional notice requirements 79 nor judicially mandated notice stan-
dards in the specific context of debarment and suspension.' l0 Although the
District of Columbia Circuit did not expressly hold that the regulatory no-
tice provisions were constitutionally inadequate in Old Dominion Dairy
Products, Inc. v. Secretary of Defense, "l it implied as much when it stated
that the government's attempt to invoke formal suspension procedures to
cure the lack of notice in its nonresponsibility determination did not satisfy
due process requirements because the suspension regulations did not re-
quire specific notice of the charges against the contractor. 182
174. 639 F.2d at 325.
175. Id at 324.
176. See supra note 146.
177. See infra notes 195-204 and accompanying text.
178. 41 C.F.R. § 1-1.605-3(a) (1981) (emphasis added).
179. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). See supra
notes 128-29 and accompanying text.
180. See OldDominion, 631 F.2d at 967.
181. 631 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
182. Id
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The court's decision to uphold the regulations' general notice require-
ments is especially troubling in view of its conclusion that the opportunity
to.rebut allegations of misconduct is only meaningful when adequate no-
tice is given. It can be inferred that where adequate notice is not given both
due process notice requirements and hearing requirements are violated.
However, the GSA regulations as approved by the court do not provide for
specific notice; therefore, each time a contractor is given such notice and
simultaneously refused a hearing, his constitutional rights automatically
will be violated. Thus, the court's decision will force subsequent contrac-
tors to go to court when they too are given "general notice" as authorized
by the regulations. Unfortunately, judicial relief may come too late for a
suspended contractor, which, like Transco, conducts a substantial portion
of its business with the government. As the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia recognized in Art-Metal, 83 it is unreasonable to
expect a suspended government contractor to be able to rapidly convert its
public sales to the private sector.18 4
By approving the FPR suspension regulations, the Sixth Circuit has
given the federal agencies and the Congress a blueprint for their current
attempts to revise the existing debarment-suspension system. 85 The
court's refusal to hold the regulations' general notice requirements uncon-
stitutional, and its failure to articulate appropriate standards for an "ade-
quate evidence" determination are likely to be reflected in the impending
revisions to the debarment and suspension regulations.
Transco's opportunity to rebut the charges against it was crucial to the
Sixth Circuit's holding that the GSA procedures were not constitutionally
defective. In assessing whether the opportunity to present rebuttal infor-
mation satisfied due process, the court properly recognized that a balanc-
183. 473 F. Supp. 1. See supra notes 108-15 and accompanying text.
184. Id. at 4. The court stated that "[we] would have to be blind to the realities to con-
clude that Art-Metal would be able to shift its long-established commercial patterns to pri-
vate purchases on essentially a 'moment's notice."' The difficulties inherent in fashioning
appropriate relief many months after the fact of suspension were recognized by the Sixth
Circuit. The court was unable to predict whether Transco would have been removed from
the suspension list had it received adequate notice and an interim hearing, 639 F.2d 318,
325. See also Old Dominion, 631 F.2d at 969. Given the admitted inadequacy of judicial
relief in suspension situations, as well as the Supreme Court's command that notice be suffi-
ciently specific, the Sixth Circuit should have ruled the regulatory notice provisions
unconstitutional.
185. See infra notes 209-13 and accompanying text. Although the Transco Security court
upheld the constitutionality of the FPR suspension regulations, the decision is equally appli-
cable to the military agencies because the DAR language is virtually identical to that upheld
in Transco Security. Compare 32 C.F.R. § 1-605.2(a) (1981) with 41 C.F.R. § 1-1.605-2(a)(2)
(1981).
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ing of interests must occur whenever an important private interest is
affected by governmental action. However, the Transco court limited its
analysis to a balancing of the "governmental versus private interest in-
volved."' 6 In so doing, it disregarded the Supreme Court's more recent
adoption of a three-part balancing test requiring consideration of whether
the administrative procedures used may result in an erroneous deprivation
of private (contractor) interests.18 7
The court concluded, albeit without express articulation, that the risk of
erroneous deprivation in Transco's case was slim since the decision to sus-
pend was to be made by a high administrative official within the sus-
pending agency. While, on its face, due process appears to be served by
such a procedure,188 the court overlooked the fact that in this case Transco
would be forced to submit evidence to the same "high level" official who
previously refused to provide adequate notice to the contractor without
judicial intervention. Moreover, as recognized by the Art-Metal court, 8 9
there are no guarantees that the "high level" administrator will not be in-
fluenced by political or public relations considerations either in making his
decision to suspend or in subsequently reviewing a contractor's evidence in
opposition to the suspension.
The possible partiality of the "high level" administrator suggests a sec-
ond point inadequately addressed by the appellate court. The decision to
suspend must be based only on "adequate evidence" of wrongdoing as
determined by a high administrative official, as opposed to an adjudicative
determination of the validity of the allegations by an administrative law
judge or other impartial panel. The "adequate evidence" standard has
been analogized to one of "probable cause" by the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia in Home Brothers.9 o The regulations
186. This balancing test was articulated by the Supreme Court in Cafeteria & Restaurant
Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961). See supra note 126.
187. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976).
188. Indeed, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Old
Dominion recognized that a full-blown hearing was not necessary. 631 F.2d at 968.
189. 473 F. Supp. at 1. Further support for questioning the impartiality of agency-debar-
ring officials is found in the case of Peter Kiewit Sons' Co. v. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 534 F.
Supp. 1139 (D.D.C. 1982). In that case, the district court found that congressional criticism
prompted the Army to a de facto debarment of Kiewit by denying it contracts for a period of
five months, without affording it constitutionally required notice and an opportunity to be
heard. The court held that congressional intervention into the debarment process, including
ex parte communications, violated Kiewit's liberty interest. These occurrences prompted the
district court to conclude that the integrity of the quasi-judicial debarment process had been
compromised.
190. 463 F.2d at 1271. See supra note 105. According to the FPR, the decision to debar or
suspend is made by the "executive agency." 41 C.F.R. § 1-1.604 (1981) (debarment), § 1-
1.605 (1981) (suspension). Each civilian agency, in turn, is directed to establish its own inter-
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require a determination of "adequate evidence" based on credible evi-
dence, corroborated allegations, and proper factual inferences.1 9' Agency
officials are directed to examine contracts, inspection reports, correspon-
dence, and other pertinent documents in making the determination.' 92
The "adequate evidence" standard, as set forth in the regulations, is not
defined sufficiently to serve as the basis for government blacklisting. More-
over, like the court in Home Brothers, the Transco court assumes that the
determination of adequate evidence will be made by an impartial official.
If, however, the contractor is forced to submit evidence in opposition to the
same official who determined that adequate evidence for suspension ex-
isted, the contractor certainly would not be accorded fair consideration by
an impartial decisionmaker.
93
The court also failed to give adequate consideration to the available al-
ternative safeguards which protect the government's interests and afford
the contractor procedural due process. For example, the government could
have promptly instituted formal debarment or criminal proceedings, thus
entitling the contractor to a full adversarial hearing and an opportunity for
judicial review based upon a record.194 The agency also could have availed
itself of the procedures favored by the Justice Department whereby the
suspending agency and the prosecutor together review the evidence to be
used in a proposed suspension proceeding and make complete disclosure
of that evidence sufficient to support a suspension.' 95
Thus, the court could properly conclude that the opportunity to submit
evidence in opposition to the suspension would provide the contractor with
procedural due process. However, it should have done so only after con-
cluding that this information would be presented to an impartial, in-
nal procedures implementing the FPR. 41 C.F.R. § 1-1.606 (1981). The GSA supplement to
the FPR, the General Services Procurement Regulations (GSPR), provides for a chain of
review leading to a suspension determination by a "Service Commissioner," subject to re-
view by the General Services Board of Contract Appeals. Modification or termination of the
suspension is permitted only when the Service Commissioner's determination is found to
lack a reasonable basis.
191. 41 C.F.R. § 1-1.605(b) (1981) provides:
[i]n assessing whether adequate evidence exists for invoking a suspension, consid-
eration should be given to the amount of credible evidence which is available, to
the existence or absence of corroboration as to important allegations, as well as to
inferences which may properly be drawn from the existence or absence of affirma-
tive facts.
192. Id
193. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 607 (1979).
194. 41 C.F.R. § 1-1.604 (1981).
195. See Hearings supra note 21, at 437. Information carved out in this fashion will not
prejudice a continuing criminal investigation, either because such evidence is already public
or because it is not the focus of the criminal investigation.
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dependent reviewer, and only upon a showing that alternative remedies
other than summary suspension would have protected the government's
interests.
III. GOVERNMENT-WIDE DEBARMENT AND SUSPENSION:
REGULATIONS IN THE WAKE OF TRANSCO
A. Congressional Initiatives
In view of the serious nature of the sanctions of debarment and suspen-
sion, federal agencies in the past have been reluctant to use their power to
impose them. Nevertheless, they are being used with increasing fre-
quency.196 Moreover, further increases in the use of these sanctions are
likely as a result of the growing emphasis on eliminating waste and abuse
in federal programs.197
In March 1981, the Senate Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on
Oversight of Government Management held hearings on federal debar-
ment and suspension procedures. The subcommittee concluded that there
were three major problems with the existing debarment and suspension
system: (1) agencies do not debar or suspend contractors suspected of
fraudulent or irresponsible conduct; (2) they fail to take advantage of other
agencies' information which previously led to a suspension; and (3) agen-
cies often fail to impose reciprocal suspensions or debarments.' 98
Accordingly, the subcommittee made a series of recommendations to the
Interagency Task Force on Debarment and Suspension. 199 The two major
196. According to the Senate Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management,
DOD debarments increased from a low of 25 in 1975 to a high of 39 in 1980. GSA statistics
reflect the greatest increase in debarments and suspensions, with 29 debarments and 42 sus-
pensions in 1980, compared to no suspensions and 13 debarments in 1978. Id at 463.
197. The political pressures for curbing fraud and waste within the federal bureaucracy
are exemplified by the Senate Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management's
recent hearings in this area. See supra note 21. A further example of fraud, waste, and abuse
prevention efforts is the Inspector General Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-452, 92 Stat. 1101
(1978), 5 U.S.C. app. I (Supp. V 1981), which established Offices of Inspector General
within the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Housing and Urban Development, Inte-
rior, Labor, and Transportation, and within the Community Services Administration, the
Environmental Protection Agency, the General Services Administration, the National Aero-
nautics and Space Administration, the Small Business Administration, and the Veterans
Administration. The various Inspectors General were given a broad statutory mandate to
audit and investigate the agencies' overall operations.
198. SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT OF GOV-
ERNMENT MANAGEMENT, 97TH CONG., IST SESS., REFORM OF GOVERNMENT-WIDE DE-
BARMENT AND SUSPENSION PROCEDURES 11 (Comm. Print 1981) [hereinafter cited as
COMM. REP.].
199. The task force was established by OFPP to assist in developing the debarment and
suspension provisions. Id at iii.
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changes urged by the subcommittee were (1) that new government-wide
debarment and suspension regulations be issued making debarments and
suspensions by one agency binding on all other agencies; and (2) that the
GSA debarred-suspended bidders list be updated daily and distributed
quarterly (as opposed to the current practice of semiannual distribu-
tion).2°° The subcommittee also urged that contracting officers be prohib-
ited from awarding contracts to listed bidders absent compelling
circumstances, and that the Justice Department issue a policy statement
encouraging agencies to pursue administrative sanctions when sufficient
evidence of fraud or poor performance exists.20'
Finally, the subcommittee announced plans to consider legislation that
would establish a statutory presumption of validity for individual agency
suspensions and debarments.2 °2 According to the subcommittee report,
legislation would serve both to clarify the underlying statutory basis for
such action and demonstrate congressional recognition of the importance
of this subject.203
B. Proposed Office of Federal Procurement Policy Guidance
In response to these congressional criticisms, the Office of Federal Pro-
curement Policy (OFPP) has issued Policy Letter 81- 321 setting forth gov-
ernment-wide debarment and suspension rules which incorporate the
Senate Oversight Subcommittee's recommendations. The Policy Letter
also establishes a uniform framework of causes and procedures for debar-
ment and suspension actions. The new rules attempt to satisfy due process
requirements by providing for notice and "fact-finding proceedings" if the
debarment or suspension is not based on a conviction or indictment. Fact-
finding proceedings (not necessarily a hearing) are not guaranteed, how-
200. Id. at 18-20.
201. Id at 18.
202. Id at 19. The full Congress has already acted to make civilian agencies' debarments
and suspensions binding on the Department of Defense. Section 914(a) of the 1982 Defense
Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 97-86, 95 Stat. 1099 (1982), prohibits the military agencies
from dealing with contractors who have been debarred or suspended by other agencies,
absent a determination by the Secretary of the procuring agency that there are "compelling
reasons" to award to the debarred or suspended firm.
203. Id Senate Governmental Affairs Subcommittee member Carl Levin (D-Mich.) sub-
sequently introduced S. 1882, patterned on the 1982 Defense Authorization Act provisions,
discussed infra at note 215, which would prohibit all federal agencies from "soliciting offers
from, awarding contracts to, extending contracts with, or approving subcontracts for any
person who has been debarred or suspended by another agency," 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127
CONG.REc. 13,937-38 (1981). The bill is currently pending before the Senate Governmental
Affairs Committee.
204. 46 Fed. Reg. 37,832 (1981).
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ever. They will be conducted only if the contractor's information or argu-
ments submitted in opposition to the proposed action raise a genuine
dispute over the material facts.205
The Policy Letter also provides guidance to the agencies on two issues
not addressed by the interagency task force. First, it recognizes that debar-
ment or suspension of a contractor by one agency may have a serious im-
pact on other agencies' operations. If such is the case, agencies are urged to
coordinate their actions, perhaps with one agency designated as the lead
agency for making debarment or suspension decisions.20 6 Second, the Pol-
icy Letter advises agencies to use their regulatory and statutory authority
to withhold payments due under a contract in order to recoup funds paid
as a result of fraud or other misconduct.20 7
C Problems With the Proposal
Technically OFPP's authority to require an agency to debar or suspend
a contractor government-wide is questionable since each agency's right to
suspend or debar is grounded in its general procurement authority which
does not extend to purchases by other agencies. As a practical matter, how-
ever, each agency will implement this policy suggestion in its own regula-
tions, 208 and thus will be acting under its own procurement authority.
More importantly, the proposed procedures do not meet the due process
requirements established by the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia2' and by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Transco. These cases basically hold that a contractor must be given speqflc
notice of the charges against it and the opportunity to defend against the
charges. The proposed regulatory coverage merely provides that irregulari-
ties be described "in terms sufficient to place the contractor on notice with-
out disclosing the Government's evidence. 210
The courts have also addressed the type ofhearing that a suspended con-
tractor must receive. In general, contractors are entitled to an opportunity
to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses.21 1 Although the pro-
posed rules contemplate such a procedure, a hearing is not guaranteed;
205. Id at 37,837.
206. Id at 37,833.
207. Id
208. In adopting their own debarment and suspension regulations, patterned on the Fed-
eral Procurement Regulations, many civilian agencies have sought to tailor these regulations
to their individual procurement needs. For a list of the various agency debarment and sus-
pension regulations, see COMM. REP., .supra note 197, at 4 n.5.
209. See supra notes 89-107 and accompanying text.
210. 46 Fed. Reg. at 37,837 (1981).
211. See Gonzalez, 334 F.2d at 578.
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instead one will be held only when the suspending official, not necessarily
a lawyer or Administrative Law Judge, concludes that the contractor's sub-
mission raises a dispute of material fact.21 2 Thus, a hearing could be de-
nied solely on an agency representative's interpretation of the facts.
As is the case under the current regulations, Policy Letter 81-3 provides
different standards of proof for debarment and suspension. A debarment
which is not based on a conviction must be proved by substantial evidence;
whereas the lesser sanction of suspension need only be proved by adequate
evidence. The adequate evidence standard has been analogized to "prob-
able cause" by the courts.213 OFPP's proposal, however, would base the
determination of adequate evidence on how much information is available
and whether "important allegations" are corroborated. This minimal defi-
nition arguably conflicts with the Home Brothers dicta, and it provides no
guarantee that suspension will not be arbitrary or capricious.
Two additional provisions of the proposed procedures deserve attention.
First, the Policy Letter deletes that portion of the current regulations which
affords agencies discretionary authority to impose debarments and suspen-
sions on a case-by-case basis.2 4 This omission could conceivably allow
debarring officials to infer that these sanctions must be imposed automati-
cally. Such a construction would run counter to existing district court and
contract appeals board precedents.21 5 Second, the Policy Letter gives the
debarring official the discretion to extend the debarment sanction to affili-
ates, provided they are given written notice of the proposed debarment and
an opportunity to respond to the issue "of their status as affiliates., 2 6 This
212. See supra note 204. The American Bar Association House of Delegates has ap-
proved a recommendation by the Public Contract Law Section urging that Congress enact a
Debarment and Suspension Reform Act designed to cure what are viewed as "widespread
deficiencies in notice, opportunity for evidentiary proceedings and combinations of
prosecutorial and judicial functions." Among the changes recommended by the ABA is that
government-wide debarment and suspension determinations be made by an independent
Debarment and Suspension Board of administrative judges. 9 GOV'T CONT. REP. (CCH)
92,563 (1982).
213. See Horn Brothers, 463 F.2d at 1271.
214. See 41 C.F.R. § 1-1.604(b)(2) (1981), stating that existence of a cause for debarment
does not require that a firm or individual be debarred. Rather, the decision is in the agency's
discretion and it must consider the seriousness of the offense and all mitigating factors. See
also 32 C.F.R. § 1-604.1 (1981).
215. See, e.g., Roemer v. Hoffmann, 419 F. Supp. 130 (D.D.C. 1976); Winnie Fay Ow-
ings, HUD BCA No. 80-468-D16, 81-1 BCA 15,048.
216. 46 Fed. Reg. 37,836 (1981). The proposed guidance also extends the definition of
affiliates to individuals who directly or indirectly own, manage, or control the debarred com-
pany in whole or in part. Id at 37,834. The Policy Letter states that:
business concerns or individuals are affiliates if, directly or indirectly: (1) either one
owns, manages, directs, or controls the other in whole or in part, or has the power
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opportunity is insufficient in view of the severity of the sanctions to be
imposed. It is inequitable to automatically attribute to all affiliates knowl-
edge and responsibility for the particular facts with respect to any given
procurement, and this approach reflects an unrealistic view of today's com-
plex corporation structures. The Office of Federal Procurement Policy
should provide a standard for judging a corporate or individual affiliate's
culpability with respect to the debarment causes, and allow affiliates to
challenge both their status as affiliates and the underlying causes and scope
of the debarment.
D. Recommendations
At the very least, the proposal should be amended to provide for more
uniform and equitable procedures. Equity requires that government-wide
debarment and/or suspension should not be a one-way street. Accord-
ingly, OFPP should consider developing a mechanism whereby clearance
by one agency would give rise to a rebuttable presumption that the con-
tractor be cleared by all agencies. Such a provision would make the bind-
ing nature of debarments and suspensions more balanced. Further, it
would save contractors from having to clear themselves before every fed-
eral agency following a government-wide debarment or suspension.
In addition, the terms "affiliate" and "adequate evidence" should be
more clearly defined, and the hearing procedures should be amended to
expressly provide for production of witnesses and cross-examination.
These changes are crucial to insure adequate due process.
Finally, it is essential that minimum qualifications be established for of-
ficials responsible for debarment and suspension determinations and that
such officials be competent, independent adjudicators of the facts. It makes
little sense to give the contractor an opportunity to respond to allegations
of wrongdoing if the functions of prosecutor, grand jury, and judge rest in
a single official. To preclude this result, and in order to provide specific
notice and adequate hearing procedures for suspended contractors, OFPP
should reappraise its approach prior to adopting the proposed debarment
and suspension regulations. As Judge Green pointed out, the public inter-
est in assuring honest, efficient government is not served through contrac-
tor blacklisting based on mere suspicion." 7
to do so; or (2) another owns, manages, directs, or controls both in whole or in part
or has the power to do so.
Id The current regulations limit "affiliate" to business concerns. See 41 C.F.R. § 1-1.601-
1(e) (1981).
217. 473 F. Supp. 1, 8 (D.D.C. 1978).
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IV. CONCLUSION
In Transco Security, Inc. of Ohio v. Freeman, the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals upheld the constitutionality of the FPR suspension regulations,
concluding that the opportunity to submit information in opposition to a
suspension action constituted a "meaningful opportunity" to be heard. The
court ruled that where all the proper procedures are followed, a potential
eighteen-month suspension is not constitutionally defective.
The Sixth Circuit's rationale is flawed in three major respects. First, its
conclusion that the opportunity to submit information in opposition to a
suspension constitutes a meaningful opportunity to be heard is based on
the erroneous premise that agency officials can equitably serve as prosecu-
tor, grand jury, and judge. Second, although the court correctly deter-
mined that the notice given to Transco was constitutionally defective, its
refusal to hold the suspension notice procedures themselves unconstitu-
tional will force other contractors to seek judicial relief when they too are
given "general notice" as authorized by the regulations. Thus, the court's
decision virtually guarantees additional litigation as more and more con-
tractors are suspended prior to indictment. Finally, the court's decision left
unanswered a number of questions regarding the method of determining
whether "adequate evidence" to suspend exists. As a result, the Executive
Branch and Congress have attempted to fill this gap with proposed regula-
tions that evidence a clear disregard for contractors' due process rights.
To avoid the Alice in Wonderland result of "sentence first-verdict after-
wards," 218 contractors must be given specific notice and a meaningful op-
portunity to rebut the charges against them. The power to debar or
suspend may destroy a contractor who, like Transco, does a substantial
amount of its business with the government. The general public, as well as
federal contractors, have an interest in assuring that these administrative
sanctions are exercised fairly.
V. EPILOGUE
As this Note went to press, the Office of Federal Procurement Policy
issued its government-wide debarment, suspension, and ineligibility rules
in final form.219 The revised Policy Letter 82-1 is scheduled to take effect
on September 1, 1982. The Policy Letter retains the basic concept of gov-
ernment-wide debarment and suspension by providing that a contractor
who is not responsible to do business with one agency is not responsible to
218. Id.
219. 47 Fed. Reg. 28,854 (1982).
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do business with any agency.220
A number of revisions have been made in the final version of the rules,
presumably in an attempt to provide contractors with a measure of protec-
tion against unwarranted debarments and suspensions. For example, the
standard for debarment has been changed to a "preponderance of the evi-
dence" as opposed to "substantial evidence," and the "adequate evidence"
standard for suspension proceedings has been clarified to some extent.221
"Adequate evidence" is now defined as "information sufficient to support
the reasonable belief that a particular act or omission has occurred.2 22 Fi-
nally, suspended contractors will be able to "appear with counsel, submit
documentary evidence, present witnesses and confront any person the
agency presents" provided the suspension is not based on an indictment
and that a hearing would not prejudice pending or contemplated legal
proceedings.223
Despite these changes, however, the OFPP's rules fall short of providing
contractors with adequate due process. Although additional safeguards
have been added to the hearing procedures, a hearing following suspen-
sion is still not guaranteed. Rather, a hearing is conditioned on a determi-
nation that the contractor's submission in opposition raises a genuine
material factual dispute. 224 Moreover, the required notice remains nonspe-
cific, 225 and qualifications for debarring and suspending officials are left to
the agencies' discretion.226
OFPP has asserted that the Policy Letter provides adequate procedural
safeguards for contractors.227 It remains to be seen how the courts will
react when confronted with the first judicial challenge to the new rules.
Lisa A. Everhart
220. Id at 28,855.
221. Id at 28,855-86.
222. Id at 28,857.
223. Id at 28,860.
224. Id
225. Id
226. Id at 28,857.
227. Id at 28.855.
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